Can Pipelines Bypass the Strait of Hormuz? The Limits for Oil and LNG

Direct answer: Pipelines can soften a disruption, not replace the strait

Pipelines provide routes around the Strait of Hormuz, but their existence does not mean Gulf energy exports could continue normally during a major maritime disruption.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 20 million barrels per day of petroleum passed through Hormuz in 2024. That represented roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and more than one-quarter of seaborne oil trade.

The EIA also estimated that Saudi and UAE pipelines had about 2.6 million barrels per day of additional bypass capacity. That figure was published in June 2025 and reflected utilization at that time. It is not a verified measure of available capacity during the June 2026 conflict.

The practical question is therefore not simply whether a bypass exists. It is how much additional volume the system can carry after accounting for current throughput—and the supplied sources do not establish the current combined Saudi-UAE answer.

What changed in June 2026?

Saudi Aramco’s East-West Pipeline carries crude from the Abqaiq area to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The EIA lists its standard capacity at 5 million barrels per day and notes that a previous conversion enabled operation at up to 7 million barrels per day.

The Associated Press reported on June 18, 2026, that Aramco had raised flows through the route to its 7 million-barrel-per-day maximum.

That operating claim demonstrates the pipeline’s value as a bypass. It also changes how the capacity number should be interpreted: maximum throughput is evidence of substantial rerouting, but it may leave little or no additional Saudi headroom.

The UAE operates another bypass connecting onshore fields with the Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of Oman. Its stated capacity is 1.8 million barrels per day. The EIA reported in June 2025 that increased routine use had reduced the capacity available for an emergency, but the supplied sources do not provide a current June 2026 utilization figure.

Measure	Date and reported figure	What it establishes	What it does not establish
Saudi East-West Pipeline	AP reported 7 million barrels per day on June 18, 2026	The route was operating at its reported maximum	Additional Saudi headroom after that point
UAE pipeline to Fujairah	Stated capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day	The route can move connected crude outside Hormuz	Current throughput or June 2026 unused capacity
Combined additional Saudi-UAE capacity	EIA estimated 2.6 million barrels per day in June 2025	Estimated headroom based on utilization at that time	Current combined headroom during the June 2026 conflict
Petroleum passing through Hormuz	About 20 million barrels per day in 2024	The scale of crude, condensate, and product flows through the strait	Current daily traffic during the conflict

The easy mistake is to place the 7 million, 1.8 million, and 2.6 million figures in the same column as though they describe the same thing. They do not: one is reported throughput, one is design capacity, and one is an older estimate of unused capacity.

Which fuels can actually use the bypasses?

Crude oil and condensate

The principal bypass routes are designed most directly for crude oil and condensate. Saudi Arabia can move connected crude west to Yanbu, while the UAE can send connected production east to Fujairah.

These are not general-purpose regional pipelines available to every Gulf producer. The supplied sources do not establish that exports from countries such as Kuwait or Iraq could simply be transferred into them.

The relevant details are physical: which fields feed the line, where the oil is processed, which terminal receives it, and whether buyers and vessels can use that loading point.

Refined petroleum products

The EIA reported that from 2022 through 2024, crude oil and condensate flows through Hormuz decreased by 1.6 million barrels per day, while petroleum-product shipments increased by 500,000 barrels per day.

The main bypass systems are described primarily as crude pipelines. Moving crude outside Hormuz does not automatically preserve exports of gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel at the same rate.

Products require suitable storage, loading facilities, vessels, destinations, and commercial schedules. A functioning crude bypass should not be treated as an equal substitute for disrupted product shipments.

Liquefied natural gas

Liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is a separate constraint. The EIA reported that about one-fifth of global LNG trade passed through Hormuz in 2024, mostly from Qatar.

Saudi and UAE oil pipelines cannot transport those LNG volumes. The supplied sources identify no immediate LNG bypass of comparable scale.

Crude exports could therefore be partially maintained while LNG shipping remains constrained. Tracking oil alone would miss that divergence.

Who is most directly exposed?

In 2024, Asian markets received 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the LNG moving through Hormuz. China, India, Japan, and South Korea together accounted for 69% of total crude and condensate flows through the strait.

Direct U.S. import exposure was smaller. The United States imported about 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil and condensate through Hormuz from Persian Gulf countries in 2024. That represented approximately 7% of U.S. crude and condensate imports and 2% of U.S. petroleum liquids consumption.

Smaller direct exposure does not mean no operational exposure. A disruption may affect shipping availability, competition for alternative supplies, transportation costs, and refined-product flows.

The supplied sources do not establish the direction or size of those indirect effects. They support exposure mapping, not a deterministic price forecast.

How should operators read disruption scenarios?

These scenarios describe transportation conditions, not predicted market outcomes.

Scenario	Physical conditions	Indicators to check first	Interpretation boundary
Continued transit	Most vessels continue passing while bypass pipelines operate at routine or elevated levels	Transit by vessel type, pipeline throughput, and Yanbu and Fujairah loadings	Political tension does not necessarily mean physical supply has stopped
Partial disruption	Delays, cancellations, or declining transit affect particular vessel categories	Crude, product, and LNG vessel counts; insurance terms; waiting vessels; terminal loadings	Additional crude routing does not resolve product or LNG constraints
Severe disruption	Hormuz transit falls sharply while bypass systems operate near their limits	Verified remaining headroom, storage, terminal operations, and actual loadings	Design ratings and older spare-capacity estimates are not current operating capacity

A total-vessel count can be misleading. Crude tankers might continue moving while LNG traffic declines, or crude might reach an outside terminal by pipeline while product shipments remain constrained.

Proposed infrastructure should also remain separate from operating capacity. AP reported on June 18, 2026, that European leaders were discussing energy-route alternatives with Gulf partners, but no specific projects or schedules had been established. Those proposals cannot move current cargo.

An operational exposure checklist

• Classify contracts and suppliers by crude oil, refined petroleum products, or LNG.
• Identify each supply source’s actual export terminal and whether it lies inside or outside Hormuz.
• Label every pipeline figure as design capacity, reported throughput, or verified unused capacity.
• Do not carry the EIA’s June 2025 headroom estimate forward as a current June 2026 figure.
• Check whether refineries, vessel schedules, and destinations can accommodate rerouted crude.
• Review whether LNG contracts allow an alternate origin or schedule adjustment.
• Monitor storage, berthing, and loading operations at Yanbu and Fujairah.
• Keep proposed construction separate from infrastructure operating today.

The decision-useful question is specific: which product can move from which origin to which terminal, and how much additional volume has been verified as available now?

What to monitor next

First, track transit by vessel type. Crude tankers, product tankers, and LNG carriers can face different conditions at the same chokepoint.

Second, watch for dated reports of actual pipeline throughput. AP’s June 18 report placed the Saudi route at its maximum, but fast-changing utilization claims require explicit timestamps.

Third, seek current UAE throughput before estimating combined Saudi-UAE headroom. The supplied sources provide a design rating and an older spare-capacity estimate, not a verified June 2026 combined figure.

Fourth, monitor the terminals at each pipeline’s endpoint. An operating pipeline cannot deliver its nominal export capacity if storage, berthing, or loading operations become constrained.

Finally, treat Qatari LNG movements as a separate indicator. Continued crude exports do not establish that LNG shipping is equally secure.

The bypass pipelines can preserve part of the crude flow, but their role is mitigation rather than full substitution. The next meaningful data point is not another headline capacity figure. It is a dated measure of actual throughput and remaining headroom for each route.